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Executive Summary 
 
Over $400 billion were donated to nonprofits in 2017, a record high [1]. However, despite the 
increases in charitable dollars, the share of households that donate has been declining: in 
2000, 67 percent of American households donated to nonprofits, but in 2014, only 56 percent 
of American households donated [2]. This trend in decreasing donors pre-dates the passage of 
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), but could be accelerated by the recent policy 
changes. TCJA significantly changed federal tax policy and these changes are expected to 
affect charitable giving [3-5]. Nonprofit leaders, as well as policymakers, have been exploring 
additional policy proposals to offset the potential negative impact on charitable giving. 
 
This study used the Penn Wharton Budget Model [6; 7] to run microsimulations of the effects of 
five tax policy proposals on charitable giving dollars and the number of households that 
donate. The five proposals included: 
1. A non-itemizer charitable deduction; 
2. A non-itemizer charitable deduction with a cap for non-itemizers of $4,000 for single filers 
and $8,000 for married couples filing jointly; 
3. A non-itemizer charitable deduction with a modified 1 percent floor that allows non-
itemizers to deduct 50 percent of the value of their charitable gifts under 1 percent of AGI 
and a normal deduction for gifts over 1 percent of AGI; 
4. A non-refundable 25 percent charitable giving tax credit; and 
5. An enhanced non-itemizer charitable deduction, which provides a higher value deduction 
for low- and middle-income households:  
 Single filers earning under $20,000 can deduct 200 percent of the value of their 
charitable donations, single filers earning between $20,000 and $40,000 can deduct 
150 percent of their charitable donations, and single filers earning over $40,000 can 
deduct 100 percent of their charitable donations;0F1 and 
 Married couples filing jointly earning below $40,000 can deduct 200 percent of the value 
of their charitable donations, married couples filing jointly earning between $40,000 and 
$80,000 can deduct 150 percent of their charitable donations, and married couples filing 
jointly earning over $80,000 can deduct 100 percent of their charitable donations. 
 
Key findings include: 
• Non-refundable 25 percent tax credit: Providing a non-refundable 25% charitable 
giving tax credit to non-itemizers has the largest positive impact on both the amount of 
charitable giving dollars ($37 billion) and the number of donor households (10.6 million) 
of the five policy options analyzed. However, it is also the most “expensive” proposal for 
United States (U.S.) Treasury revenue (-$33.0 billion). 
• Non-itemizer charitable deduction: Extending the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers could generate up to $26 billion in additional donations and induce up to 7.3 
million additional households to donate in 2021. It would reduce Treasury revenue by up 
to $22 billion. 
• Charitable dollars and Treasury revenue: Four of the five policy proposals bring in 
more charitable dollars than are lost in Treasury revenue. The non-itemizer deduction 
                                                 
1 Deducting 100 percent is equivalent to the basic charitable deduction. 
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with a $4,000/$8,000 cap is the only proposal that brings in fewer additional charitable 
dollars than is lost in Treasury revenue. 
• Charitable dollars and TCJA effects: Four of the five policy proposals bring in more 
charitable dollars than were projected to have been lost as a result of TCJA. The non-
itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap is the only proposal that brings in fewer 
additional charitable dollars than is lost as a result of TCJA. 
• Number of donor households and TCJA effects: All five proposals bring in more 
donor households that were expected to be lost as a result of TCJA. 
• Non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor: The non-itemizer deduction 
with a modified 1 percent floor is also estimated to have the largest net impact on 
charitable giving dollars compared to the cost to the Treasury; it could bring in up to $7 
billion more in charitable giving than is lost in Treasury revenue. However, it brings in 
the fewest donor households. 
• Non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap:The non-itemizer deduction with a 
$4,000/$8,000 cap has the largest impact on donors per dollar cost to the Treasury. 
This policy would bring in up to 352 new donor households per million lost in Treasury 
revenue. 
 
Charitable Giving and Tax Incentives  6 
 
© 2019 The Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. All rights reserved. 
Introduction 
 
Recent trends, including the decreasing share of American households donating to nonprofits 
and the passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) have led to concerns among 
nonprofit organizations that the overall increases in charitable giving might not be sustainable 
and that the increasing concentration of giving among high-income households could lead to 
greater inequality [2; 8-10]. Some research [4; 5; 11-13], including a recent study researched 
and written by the school and commissioned by Independent Sector [3], have projected that 
some of the provisions included in the new policy (e.g. the increase in the standard deduction, 
the cut in marginal rates, the continued decrease in the number of people subject to the estate 
tax, the cut in corporate rates, etc.) will significantly reduce charitable giving [3-5; 11-13]. As a 
response to these concerns and as a way to offset the projected loss in charitable donations, 
various proposals have been made to extend the charitable deduction to non-itemizers. These 
proposals include the Charitable Giving Tax Deduction Act introduced in the United States 
House of Representatives (House) by Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) [14; 15], H.R. 1260 
introduced in the House by Representative Danny Davis (D-IL) [16], and the Universal 
Charitable Giving Act introduced in the House by Representative Mark Walker (R-NC) [17] and 
in the United States Senate by Senator James Lankford (R-OK) [18]. Other proposals have 
been supported by policymakers and thought leaders in the nonprofit sector and philanthropy 
field, but have not been introduced as actual bills. 
 
Background 
 
In 2017, charitable giving reached an all-time high of $410.02 billion,1F2 which included $286.65 
billion from individuals2F3 [1]. Overall charitable giving dollars and giving by individuals have 
generally been increasing over time, with some decreases in recession years, and overall 
charitable giving dollars have increased every year since 2010 [1]. However, the number of 
households who donate has been declining. In 2002, 68.5 percent of Americans donated to 
nonprofits,3F4 while in 2014, only 55.5 percent of Americans donated [2; 19]. Therefore, 
charitable giving appears to be increasingly concentrated among high-income households, 
who already dominate the charitable giving landscape [2; 8; 9; 19; 20]. This has led to 
concerns among nonprofit leaders, policymakers, and academics about how to increase equity 
while addressing efficiency [9; 10]. 
 
While there are many reasons that motivate people to donate, one influence is the potential tax 
benefit that they receive from their charitable contributions [21-23]. Over time, federal tax 
policy in the United States has become less progressive, lowering the tax burden on high-
income households without providing the same reductions for low-income households [24]. 
This has the potential to further reduce giving by low- and middle-income households. 
                                                 
2 2017 was the last year before the provisions of TCJA went into effect, and Giving USA did include reports from certain 
organizations that experienced an increase in year-end giving in 2017. Some donors may have shifted some of their 2018 
giving to the end of 2017, but it is difficult to disentangle behavioral shifts due to TCJA from the booming economy in year-
end 2017. It is likely that a combination of factors contributed to the record high for giving by individuals [1]. 
3 Giving by individuals includes giving to donor-advised funds, which reportedly experienced increased popularity in late 
2017. This increase in popularity could be due to TCJA and/or the strong economy [1]. 
4 The share of households donating increased slightly between 2000 and 2002 from 66.8 percent to 68.5 percent. 
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Recently, there have been various proposals to change tax policy at both the federal and state 
levels to make the tax system more progressive [25]. However, among nonprofit leaders, 
advocates, policymakers, and academics, proponents of a more fair and equitable tax code 
remain unclear about which giving incentives might best achieve their goals.  
 
Tax Policy in the United States 
 
In the United States, individuals, including citizens, residents, and nonresidents, have been 
required to pay income taxes since 1913. Taxpayers must pay a certain portion of their taxable 
income to the federal government. The portion owed is determined by their income, legal 
deductions and credits, and their marginal tax rates. Their taxable income is determined by 
subtracting their tax deductions from their adjusted gross income (AGI); this is defined as 
taxable income. In addition, taxpayers may qualify for tax credits, which are subtracted from 
the taxes owed. Tax credits reduce a taxpayers’ tax liability (amount owed) [26], but there are 
two types of tax credits, refundable and non-refundable [26]. If a credit is refundable and the 
tax credit is larger than the taxpayers’ tax liability, the taxpayer will receive the remainder of the 
credit in a refund, whereas if it is non-refundable, the taxpayer cannot benefit from the credit 
above their tax liability [26] 
 
Furthermore, tax deductions sometimes have additional limitations, including floors and caps. 
Floors set a minimum amount (dollar amount or percentage of AGI) below which the deduction 
cannot be claimed [27; 28] and caps set a maximum amount (dollar amount, percentage of 
AGI, or percentage of standard deduction) that can be deducted [28; 29].  
 
In addition, taxpayers can choose between the standard deduction or the total of their itemized 
deductions; this is typically referred to as itemization status. Itemizers’ taxable income is 
reduced by the total amount of their deductions, while non-itemizers’ taxable income is 
reduced by the standard deduction. In 2018, the standard deduction was $12,000 for single 
taxpayers and $24,000 for taxpayers who were married and filing jointly, which is nearly twice 
what it was in 2017. Table 1 shows the change in the standard deduction before and after 
TCJA was passed. The number of households who itemize was predicted to decline 
significantly after the passage of TCJA, with 88 percent of taxpayers expected to take the 
standard deduction for tax year 2018 [30]. This means that approximately 28.5 million 
households will no longer be able to benefit from the charitable deduction. 
 
Table 1. Standard deduction 
 2017 2018 pre-TCJA 
counterfactual 
2018 2019 
Individual $6,350 $6,500 $12,000 $12,200 
Married/Jointly $12,700 $13,000 $24,000 $24,400 
2020 and beyond: Future years indexed for inflation 
 
Provisions of TCJA affecting charitable giving 
In addition to the standard deduction, other provisions of TCJA directly impact the funding of 
charitable organizations (e.g. donations) and the operational side of charitable organizations 
[31; 32]. These policy changes vary with regards to whether they are expected to have a 
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positive effect on charitable giving and nonprofits or a negative effect on charitable giving and 
nonprofits [33]. 
 
Provisions that could have a positive impact on charitable giving and/or nonprofit organizations 
include: 
• Cash contribution limits: Deductions for charitable donations are based on limits 
applying as a percentage of a taxpayer’s AGI. Prior to TCJA, taxpayers could deduct 
several types of charitable contributions (cash, assets, etc.) up to 50 percent of their 
AGI. Post TCJA, the limitation has gone up from 50 percent to 60 percent of a 
taxpayer’s AGI, but only for taxpayers making exclusively cash contributions [31; 32]. 
 
Provisions that could have a negative impact on charitable giving and/or nonprofit 
organizations include: 
• Estate and gift tax: Prior to TCJA, the expected 2018 combined lifetime exemption 
(unified credit) allowed each individual up to $5.6 million and married couples up to 
$11.2 million to be transferred, tax free by gift or inheritance. Post TCJA, the amount of 
exemption doubled; $11.2 million for individuals and $22.4 million for married couples in 
2018, which will be adjusted for inflation yearly through 2025 [31; 32]. 
• Unrelated business taxable income (UBIT): TCJA requires a tax-exempt organization 
carrying more than one unrelated business to calculate its UBIT separately rather than 
on an aggregate basis prior the law. Therefore, losses from one unrelated business can 
no longer be used to offset income from another unrelated business. On the positive 
side, the tax rate applicable to UBIT has been reduced to 21 percent [31; 32]. 
• Employee fringe benefits: TCJA eliminated the employer deduction for the cost of 
certain employee fringe benefits for not-for-profit corporations. The law imposed a new 
UBIT tax on nonprofits based on their costs of some of their employee fringe benefits. 
The benefits affected are qualified transportation fringe benefits, employee pre-tax 
elections for these benefits, and parking facilities with qualified parking [31]. 
• New excise taxes imposed on executive compensation: TCJA imposes a 21 percent 
excise tax on compensation paid by certain tax-exempt employers to covered 
employees in excess of $1 million or on excess parachute payments paid to covered 
employees [31; 32]. 
• New excise tax on college and university endowments: TCJA imposes a new excise 
tax on some colleges and universities4F5 in the amount of 1.4 percent of the institution’s 
net investment income for the tax year [31; 32]. 
• Deductions for payments to colleges and universities for the right to purchase 
athletic event tickets: Prior to TCJA, taxpayers making donations to colleges and 
universities could deduct 80 percent of the amount donated to receive the right to buy 
athletic event tickets. After TCJA, these donations are no longer deductible [31]. 
 
                                                 
5 This excludes postsecondary institutions with fewer than 500 students in the prior tax year, institutions with a majority of 
their students located outside of the U.S., state colleges and universities, and institutions with small assets (less than $500,000 
per student). Assets used for exempt purposes are not included in the determination of the value of the institution’s assets 
[31]. 
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Furthermore, other changes in tax policy resulting from TCJA that do not directly affect 
nonprofit organizations are still likely to indirectly affect charitable giving, particularly for high-
income donors. 
• Standard Deduction:  TCJA increased the standard deduction from $6,350 for 
individuals and $12,700 for married couples filing jointly to $12,000 for individuals and 
$24,000 for married couples filing jointly. Therefore, the number of taxpayers who 
itemize has significantly decreased [30], meaning fewer taxpayers will benefit from the 
charitable deduction. This is expected to have a negative effect on charitable giving [3-
5]. In contrast, some taxpayers could have more disposable income as a result of the 
increased standard deduction, which they could use to donate to nonprofits, but this is 
not expected to have a large effect. 
• Pease limitation: Prior to TCJA, the Pease limitation limited the total amount that could 
be deducted for high-income households with AGIs above a certain threshold (2017: 
$261,500 for single, $313,800 for married filing jointly). The limitation reduced the total 
of the filers’ itemized deductions by 3 percent of the difference between their AGI and 
the threshold (e.g. for a single filer making over $261,500: adjusted deduction = 
itemized deductions - .03 * (AGI - 261,500). However the reduction must be less than or 
equal to 80 percent of the filers’ itemized deductions [34]. The Pease limitation was 
repealed as part of TCJA, thereby increasing the value of the charitable deduction for 
some high-income itemizers. 
• State and local taxes (SALT) cap: Since the inception of the federal income tax in 
1913, state and local taxes have been deductible for itemizers. This includes personal 
property taxes, real estate taxes, and either income taxes or sales taxes. TCJA added a 
cap to the total amount of state and local taxes that can be deducted, limiting the 
deduction to $10,000 [35]. For the smaller number of taxpayers who can itemize given 
the higher standard deduction and the new SALT limits, this could increase the value of 
the charitable deduction because it effectively leads to a higher state tax rate.5F6 In 
addition, donating appreciated assets to avoid paying state or local taxes on them 
means that the tax benefit for these donations has increased. For those taxpayers who 
switch to taking the standard deduction because of the SALT cap, charitable giving 
could be negatively impacted as they lose access to the charitable deduction. 
• Alternative minimum tax (AMT): The AMT operates alongside the regular income tax 
system to ensure that high-income taxpayers pay at least a certain amount of taxes. In 
other words, it limits the benefits that high-income taxpayers can receive from 
deductions and credits [36]. TCJA significantly limited the number of households subject 
to the AMT (from 5.0 million in 2017 to 200,000 in 2018) [37]. While the charitable 
deduction is one of the few deductions still allowed under the AMT, the decrease in the 
number of households subject to the AMT could result in lower taxes for these 
households no longer subject to the AMT. The additional income could have an indirect, 
but positive effect on charitable giving. 
 
It is clear that federal tax policy is not only complicated, but the various provisions have both 
direct and indirect effects on charitable giving. Therefore, it is important to conduct research on 
                                                 
6 Because the value of the SALT deductions is much lower for some tax payers, some taxpayers will have a higher marginal 
tax rate on Federal taxes, and state taxes are usually determined in most part by federal tax liabilities. 
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how this and future policies could affect charitable giving and nonprofit organizations more 
generally. 
 
The Current Study 
 
The tax treatment of charitable giving influences who gives and how much they give [38]. 
Between 2000 and 2014, the number of households that donate to nonprofits declined, and 
this trend is especially strong among low- and middle-income households [2]. TCJA could also 
lead to a decline in donors. In addition, even though charitable giving dollars have been 
increasing in recent years [1], this trend might not be sustainable due to the changes 
associated with TCJA as well as the past decrease in number of donors overall. 
 
Because of this, nonprofits, policymakers, and academics have been trying to understand what 
other policy options could reverse negative giving trends. This report focuses on five policy 
options under consideration by the nonprofit sector. These options aim to offset the continued 
decline in donors, unequal treatment of taxpayers’ charitable gifts in the tax code, and the 
potential decrease in charitable giving resulting from TCJA [3-5] by targeting non-itemizers and 
making the tax incentives for charitable giving more equitable. After a brief summary of the 
methods used to estimate the effects of the five policies, the report will summarize the five 
policy options, present their estimated effects on charitable giving dollars and number of donor 
households, and discuss the differing effects of each policy among different income groups. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Microsimulations to estimate the effects of various tax proposals on charitable giving were 
conducted using the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM) [6]. This model is used to project 
the effects of government tax and spending policies and has been used in past research to 
predict the effects of policy changes on charitable giving [5]. The model uses a simulated 
population dataset that matches the overall population for many demographic and 
macroeconomic variables [7]. Additional information about the Penn Wharton Budget Model is 
included in Appendix A. 
 
In addition to outputs for charitable dollars donated and federal tax revenue, the PWBM was 
used to estimate the effects on the share of taxpayers who donate to nonprofits. While this 
type of analysis is common in the healthcare field [39-41], researchers are just beginning to 
explore how to estimate the impact of tax policy changes on taxpayer’s decision of whether or 
not to donate6F7. Therefore, this research is among the first to conduct this type of analysis on 
the application of tax policy to donor incidence7F8 [43]. 
 
Analyses were conducted using income-based tax-price elasticities of giving. In a previous 
study, the school used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID; [44]) and the Philanthropy 
                                                 
7 Extensive margin [42] 
8 The study of donor incidence rates is not new; however, the modelling of proposed tax policy on donor incidence rates is 
new. In addition, there is a large body of research on how past legislation has affected donor incidence rates, but this is very 
little that uses microsimulations to predict future (or counterfactual) effects of tax policy on donor incidence rates. 
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Module (Philanthropy Panel Study, PPS; [2]) to generate estimates for both giving by non-
itemizers and elasticities for three different income groups (<50,000; $50-$99,999; ≥$100,000) 
[3]. Additional information on the calculations to estimate these income-based tax-price 
elasticities of giving can be found in Appendix A. The income-based elasticities were used in 
conjunction with the Penn Wharton Budget Model to estimate the effects of five policy changes 
on charitable giving dollars and number of donors, both overall and by income group (first 
quintile, second quintile, third quintile, fourth quintile, 81-90 percent, 91-99 percent, and top 1 
percent). 
 
Table 2. Average giving & elasticities 
Income Bracket Percentage of Non-Itemizers Non-Itemizer Average Giving Elasticity 
<$50,000 73.5% $343 -2.236 
$50,000-99,999 21.3% $858 -1.490 
$100,000+ 5.3% $1,586 -1.182 
 
In addition, because some previous research, including the Congressional Research Service 
and Congressional Budget Office [45; 46], assumes lower responsiveness by tax payers to 
changes in charitable giving, we also estimate the same analyses using a low responsive 
elasticity (-0.5) and a moderate responsive elasticity (-1.0). These results are included in 
Appendix C. 
 
Using the TCJA as a baseline, we used the microsimulation models to estimate the effects of 
the following proposals:8F9 
1. A non-itemizer charitable deduction; 
2. A non-itemizer charitable deduction with a cap for non-itemizers of $4,000 for single filers 
and $8,000 for married couples filing jointly; 
3. A non-itemizer charitable deduction with a modified 1 percent floor that allows non-
itemizers to deduct 50 percent of the value of their charitable gifts under 1 percent of AGI 
and a normal deduction for gifts over 1 percent of AGI; 
4. A non-refundable 25 percent charitable giving tax credit; and 
5. An enhanced non-itemizer charitable deduction, which provides a higher value deduction 
for low- and middle-income households:  
 Single filers earning under $20,000 can deduct 200 percent of the value of their 
charitable donations, single filers earning between $20,000 and $40,000 can deduct 
150 percent of their charitable donations, and single filers earning over $40,000 can 
deduct 100 percent of their charitable donations;9F10 and 
 Married couples filing jointly earning below $40,000 can deduct 200 percent of the value 
of their charitable donations, married couples filing jointly earning between $40,000 and 
$80,000 can deduct 150 percent of their charitable donations, and married couples filing 
jointly earning over $80,000 can deduct 100 percent of their charitable donations. 
 
The results of these analyses, as well as explanations of each policy option are included in the 
results section. For each proposal we estimated the impact on charitable giving dollars, 
number of households that donate to nonprofits, and Treasury revenue. 
                                                 
9 In all analyses, the charitable deduction for itemizers was not changed. In addition, limitations that apply to the itemizer 
deduction also apply to the non-itemizer deduction (e.g. 60 percent AGI limit on cash contributions). 
10 Deducting 100 percent is equivalent to the basic charitable deduction. 
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Results: Charitable Giving 
Summary 
Charitable Giving 
Under TCJA, the model predicts that 88.6 million households will donate approximately $342 
billion in 2021. In line with previous research [3-5; 11], these estimates are lower than what 
would have been predicted for that year had TCJA not passed (Pre-TCJA Counterfactual). 
Analyses of changes in charitable giving dollars, number of donor households, and Treasury 
revenue are compared to the baseline 2021 estimates. All five policy options are estimated to 
have a positive impact on both charitable giving dollars and number of donor households at all 
income levels. In addition, all five policy options are estimated to more than offset the potential 
negative effects of TCJA on the number of households that donate. Four of the five policy 
options are estimated to more than offset the potential negative effects of TCJA on charitable 
giving and bring in more charitable dollars than are lost in Treasury revenue. The non-itemizer 
deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap is the only policy option that does not bring in more 
charitable dollars than were projected to be lost as a result of TCJA or than could be lost in 
Treasury revenue. 
Table 3. Summary of effects of five policy options on charitable giving and number of donors, 2021 
Charitable 
Dollars1 (A) 
Donors2 (B) Treasury 
Revenue1,3 (C) 
Net dollars1,4 
(D) 
Relative Donor 
Incidence5 (E) 
Baseline $341.9 88.6 
Pre-TCJA 
Counterfactual10F11
$360.3 91.0 
Change from 2021 Baseline 
(1) Non-itemizer
deduction (UCD*)
$26.2 (7.7%) 7.3 (8.2%) -$21.6 (-0.6%) $4.6 338 
(2) UCD with
$4,000/$8000 cap 
$17.4 (5.1%) 7.0 (7.9%) -$19.9 (-0.5%) -$2.5 352 
(3) UCD with 
modified 1% floor 
$24.9 (7.3%) 4.6 (5.2%) -$17.9 (-0.5%) $7.0 257 
(4) 25% Credit $36.9 (10.8%) 10.6 (12.0%) -$33.0 (-0.9%) $3.9 321 
(5) Enhanced UCD $29.2 (8.5%) 8.4 (9.5%) -$24.3 (-0.7%) $4.9 346 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
3Fiscal year 
4Charitable dollars (A) – Treasury cost (|B|) 
5Number of new donor households per $1 million in Treasury costs 
*Universal charitable deduction
The 25 percent credit for non-itemizers (Policy 4) is estimated to have the largest effect on 
both charitable dollars donated and the number of households who donate. The credit could 
increase giving by up to $37 billion (an increase of up to 11 percent over current law) in 2021 
with up to 10.6 million additional households donating (an increase of up to 12 percent over 
11 The estimate “Pre-TCJA Counterfactual” is the amount of charitable giving dollars and number of households that donate 
that would be expected for those years had TCJA not passed. 
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current law). However, it would also be the most expensive option for the Treasury, costing up 
to $33 billion in Treasury revenue (a decrease of up to 0.9 percent from current law). 
 
The enhanced non-itemizer deduction (Policy 5) is estimated to have the next largest effect on 
charitable giving dollars and number of donor households, increasing charitable giving by up to 
$29 billion (an increase of up to 9 percent over current law) and increasing the number of 
households donating by up to 8.4 million (an increase of up to 10 percent over current law) 
households. It would reduce Treasury revenue by up to $24 billion (a decrease of up to 0.7 
percent from current law), making it the second most expensive option for the Treasury. 
 
The basic non-itemizer deduction (Policy 1) is estimated to have the third largest effect on 
charitable giving dollars and number of donor households, increasing charitable giving by up to 
$26 billion (an increase of up to 8 percent over current law) and increasing the number of 
households donating by up to 7.3 million (an increase of up to 8 percent over current law) 
households. It would reduce Treasury revenue by up to $22 billion (a decrease of up to 0.6 
percent from current law), making it the third most expensive option for the Treasury. 
 
The non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor (Policy 3) is estimated to have the 
fourth largest effect on charitable giving dollars, but the smallest effect on number of donor 
households, increasing charitable giving by up to $25 billion (an increase of up to 7 percent 
over current law) and increasing the number of households donating by up to 4.6 million (an 
increase of up to 5 percent over current law) households. It would reduce Treasury revenue by 
up to $18 billion (a decrease of up to 0.5 percent from current law), making it the least 
expensive option for the Treasury. 
 
The non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap (Policy 2) is estimated to have the 
smallest effect on charitable giving dollars, but the second smallest effect on number of 
donors, increasing charitable giving by up to $17 billion (an increase of up to 5 percent over 
current law) and increasing the number of households donating by up to 7.0 million (an 
increase of up to 8 percent over current law) households. It would reduce Treasury revenue by 
up to $20 billion (a decrease of up to 0.5 percent from current law), making it the second least 
expensive option for the Treasury. This is the only policy option that does not bring in more 
charitable dollars than are lost in Treasury revenue. 
 
In the next section, we describe why we analyzed each of the five policy options, the pros and 
cons of each policy, and the separate effects of each policy by income bracket. Appendix B, 
includes tables comparing the various policy options within income groups. 
 
Policy Options 
 
The effects of each policy are presented in table format and include the change in the number 
of dollars donated by that income group and the number of donor households within that 
income group. The policies include a non-itemizer deduction, a non-itemizer deduction with a 
$4,000/$8,000 cap, a non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor, a non-refundable 
25 percent credit for non-itemizers, and an enhanced non-itemizer deduction. 
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In the tables below for each policy proposal 
(Tables 5-9), the percentages are 
calculated as changes from the expected 
giving levels for 2021 (shown in Table 4). 
Because most charitable giving comes from 
high-income donors, the fifth quintile (top 20 
percent income bracket) was further broken 
down into three income groups: the 81st to 
90th percentile, the 91st to 99th percentile, 
and the top 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated charitable giving dollars and 
number of donor households by income group, 2021 
Income Bracket Dollars1 Donors2 
Bottom 20% $11.5 10.3 
21%-40% $18.9 12.9 
41%-60% $33.3 16.2 
61%-80% $64.2 21.5 
81%-90% $48.9 13.1 
91%-99% $85.4 13.0 
Top 1% $79.7 1.5 
Overall $341.9 88.6 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
 
 
Policy 1: Non-itemizer deduction 
 
The non-itemizer charitable deduction would extend the current deduction currently available 
to itemizer to non-itemizers. This is sometimes called a universal charitable deduction.11F12 The 
universal charitable deduction has long been popular among nonprofits [47] and policymakers 
[14; 15; 47]. The Charitable Giving Tax Deduction Act (HR 651), which is still under 
consideration by the House Committee on Ways and Means, is the most recent example of 
this policy proposal. In addition, it has been analyzed by researchers in the past [3; 4]. It 
creates a simple tax system in which itemizers and non-itemizers receive the same type of 
giving incentive. Some critics say any type of deduction is not an equitable incentive, because 
tying the calculation to the taxpayer’s tax rate means the value of the incentive varies based on 
income. The purpose of this analysis is not to judge the policies either way, but to calculate the 
effects of each policy option relative to the base.  
 
Overall, the policy is estimated to increase charitable giving dollars by up to $26.2 billion (an 
increase of 7.7 percent over current law) and to increase the number of households that 
donate by up to 7.3 million (an increase of 8.2 percent over current law). The policy would 
reduce Treasury revenue by up to $21.6 billion (a decrease of 0.6 percent from current law). 
Therefore, the policy would bring in up to $4.6 billion more in charitable dollars than is lost in 
Treasury revenue. Furthermore, it would bring in up to 338 additional donor households per 
million dollars lost in Treasury revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The term universal deduction is sometimes used interchangeably with “above-the-line” deduction, but they are not 
identical. The universal deduction only changes the tax policies with regards to non-itemizers. An “above-the-line” deduction 
would also slightly change tax policies that affect itemizers by changing how it affects adjusted gross income and taxable 
income (and possibly changing what AGI limits apply to the deduction). We modeled a universal charitable deduction and 
did not make any changes to tax policies for itemizers. 
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Table 5. Effect of a non-itemizer deduction (Policy 1) on charitable giving dollars and number of donors by income 
bracket, 2021 
Income 
Bracket 
Dollars1 Donors2 
Billions Percent Millions Percent 
Bottom 20% $0.1 0.8% 0.1 0.9% 
21%-40% $2.0 10.8% 0.7 5.6% 
41%-60% $5.4 16.3% 1.4 8.5% 
61%-80% $7.9 12.2% 2.1 9.5% 
81%-90%3 $5.7 11.6% 1.6 12.5% 
91%-99%3 $4.6 5.4% 1.3 9.8% 
Top 1%3 $0.5 0.6% 0.1 9.0% 
Overall $26.2  7.7% 7.3 8.2% 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
3Fifth quintile: $10.2 billion (5.0 percent); 3.1 million tax units (11.2 percent) 
 
The non-itemizer deduction could stimulate the most additional charitable dollars from the top 
quintile (top 20 percent) by increasing giving by up to $10.2 billion. It would have the largest 
percentage increase in charitable dollars from the third quintile (41st to 60th percentile), 
increasing donations from that income group by up to 16 percent. It would likely bring in the 
fewest additional charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent) by only increasing 
giving by up to $100 million. It would have the smallest percentage increase in charitable 
dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), only increasing donations from that income 
group by up to 1 percent. 
 
The non-itemizer deduction could stimulate the most additional donor households from the top 
quintile (top 20 percent) by inducing up to 3 million additional households to donate. It would 
also have the largest percentage increase in donor households in the top quintile (top 20 
percent), increasing the number of donor households by up to 11 percent. It would likely bring 
in the fewest additional donor households from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent) by only 
inducing up to 100,000 additional households to donate. It would also have the smallest 
percentage increase in donor households in the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), only 
increasing the number of donor households by up to 1 percent. 
 
Policy 2: Non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap 
 
This policy is similar to the non-itemizer deduction in Policy 1 but adds a cap of $4,000 for 
single filers and $8,000 for married couples filing jointly. In other words, non-itemizers would 
be able to deduct their charitable giving up to $4,000 or $8,000 (depending on whether they 
are single filers or married couples filing jointly). However, this leaves a gap where gifts above 
the cap, but below the threshold required to itemize, would not be incentivized. Including a cap 
is a common proposal attached to deductions to limit the cost to the Treasury. Most recently 
the Universal Charitable Giving Act (HR 3988; S2123) proposed extending the charitable 
deduction to non-itemizers with a cap equal to one-third of the standard deduction12F13 [17; 18].  
 
                                                 
13 In 2018, one third of the standard deduction would be $4,000 for single filers and $8,000 for married couples filing jointly. 
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Overall, the policy is estimated to increase charitable giving dollars by up to $17.4 billion (an 
increase of 5.1 percent over current law) and to increase the number of households that 
donate by up to 7.0 million (an increase of 7.9 percent over current law). The policy would 
reduce Treasury revenue by up to $19.9 billion (a decrease of 0.5 percent from current law). 
Therefore, the policy would bring in up to $2.5 billion less in charitable dollars than is lost in 
Treasury revenue. Furthermore, it would bring in up to 352 additional donor households per 
million dollars lost in Treasury revenue (more than any other policy analyzed in this report). 
 
Adding a cap of $4,000 for single filers and $8,000 for married couples filing jointly to a non-
itemizer charitable deduction could bring in up to $9 billion less in charitable giving and induce 
300,000 fewer households to donate than a non-itemizer charitable deduction without a cap. 
However, it would reduce the cost to the Treasury by up to $2 billion compared to a non-
itemizer charitable deduction without a cap. 
 
Table 6. Effect of a non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap (Policy 2) on charitable giving dollars and 
number of donors by income bracket, 2021  
Income 
Bracket 
Dollars1 Donors2 
Billions Percent Millions Percent 
Bottom 20% $0.1 0.8% 0.1 0.9% 
21%-40% $1.5 8.0% 0.7 5.5% 
41%-60% $3.6 10.8% 1.3 8.2% 
61%-80% $5.0 7.8% 2.0 9.1% 
81%-90%3 $3.9 8.0% 1.6 12.1% 
91%-99%3 $3.1 3.6% 1.2 9.4% 
Top 1%3 $0.3 0.3% 0.1 8.6% 
Overall $17.4 5.1% 7.0 7.9% 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
3Fifth quintile: $7.2 billion (3.4 percent); 2.9 million tax units (10.5 percent) 
 
The non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap could stimulate the most additional 
charitable dollars from the top quintile (top 20 percent) by increasing giving by up to $7.2 
billion. It would have the largest percentage increase in charitable dollars from the third quintile 
(41st to 60th percentile), increasing donations from that income group by up to 11 percent. It 
would likely bring in the fewest additional charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 
percent) by only increasing giving by up to $100 million. It would have the smallest percentage 
increase in charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), only increasing 
donations from that income group by up to 1 percent. 
 
The non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap could stimulate the most additional 
donor households from the top quintile (top 20 percent) by inducing up to 2.9 million additional 
households to donate. It would also have the largest percentage increase in donor households 
in the top quintile (top 20 percent), increasing the number of donor households by up to 11 
percent. It would likely bring in the fewest additional donor households from the first quintile 
(bottom 20 percent) by only inducing up to 100,000 additional households to donate. It would 
also have the smallest percentage increase in donor households in the first quintile (bottom 20 
percent), only increasing the number of donor households by up to 1 percent. 
Charitable Giving and Tax Incentives  17 
 
© 2019 The Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. All rights reserved. 
 
Policy 3: Non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1% floor 
 
Adding a floor to the charitable deduction could be an efficient alternative to the normal non-
itemizer deduction described in Policy 1. It can control the costs to the Treasury, while having 
a relatively small impact on the amount of money donated. However, a floor is not necessarily 
equitable across income levels and it may not stimulate more donors among the populations 
where donor participation is declining, particularly low- and middle-income donors. Therefore, 
this policy is a modified version of a floor proposal. In this policy all gifts by non-itemizers 
would receive a 50 percent deduction and gifts over 1 percent of AGI would receive the normal 
deduction. Itemizers would still receive the current charitable deduction.  
 
13F
14 
This policy attempts to address concerns about equity and number of donors raised by 
nonprofits and offers a compromise between a universal charitable deduction and a charitable 
deduction with a floor. However, this policy could increase the compliance costs of taxpayers 
and the administrative costs of the IRS relative to most other options.14F15  
 
Overall, the policy is estimated to increase charitable giving dollars by up to $24.9 billion (an 
increase of 7.3 percent over current law) and to increase the number of households that 
donate by up to 4.6 million (an increase of 5.2 percent over current law). The policy would 
reduce Treasury revenue by up to $17.9 billion (a decrease of 0.5 percent from current law). 
                                                 
14 These examples ignore all the other deductions and credits, including the standard deduction, which are included in the 
actual analyses. The purpose of these examples is to simplify and clarify the policy option. 
15 Our analyses do not calculate these costs, but clearly they would be non-trivial. 
What does a modified 1 percent floor mean for taxpayers? 
 
Gifts below 1% of AGI: deduction = 50% * contributions 
Gifts above 1% of AGI: deduction = 100% * contributions 
 
Here are some simplified examples:11 
 
Example 1: A taxpayer making $50,000 who donated $1,000 in the 22% tax bracket 
  0.01 * taxable income = $500 
Tier 1 deduction = 0.5 * $500 = $250 
Tier 2 deduction = $500 
Therefore, the taxpayer can deduct $750; new AGI = $49,250 
  In the 22% tax bracket, they would owe $10,835 in taxes before credits. 
  
Example 2: A taxpayer making $75,000 who donated $1,000 in the 22% tax bracket 
  0.01 * taxable income = $750 
  Tier 1 deduction = 0.5 * $750 = $375 
Tier 2 deduction = $250 
Therefore, the taxpayer can deduct $625; new AGI = $74,375 
In the 22% tax bracket, they would owe $16,362.50 in taxes before credits. 
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Therefore, the policy would bring in up to $7.0 billion more in charitable dollars that is lost in 
Treasury revenue (more than any other policy analyzed in this report. Furthermore, it would 
bring in up to 257 additional donor households per million dollars lost in Treasury revenue 
(fewer than any other policy analyzed in this report). 
 
Adding a modified 1 percent floor to the non-itemizer deduction could bring in up to $1 billion 
less in charitable giving and induce 2.7 million fewer households to donate than a basic non-
itemizer deduction. However, it would reduce the cost to the Treasury by up to 4 billion 
compared to a basic non-itemizer charitable deduction. 
 
Table 7. Effect of a non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor (Policy 3) on charitable giving dollars 
and number of donors by income bracket  
Income 
Bracket 
Dollars1 Donors2 
Billions Percent Millions Percent 
Bottom 20% $0.1 0.8% 0.1 0.6% 
21%-40% $2.0 10.7% 0.5 3.8% 
41%-60% $5.3 16.0% 0.9 5.6% 
61%-80% $7.6 11.8% 1.3 6.1% 
81%-90%3 $5.4 11.0% 1.0 7.7% 
91%-99%3 $4.2 4.9% 0.8 5.8% 
Top 1%3 $0.3 0.4% 0.1 4.7% 
Overall $24.9 7.3% 4.6 5.2% 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
3Fifth quintile: $9.9 billion (4.6 percent); 1.8 million tax units (6.5 percent) 
 
The non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor could stimulate the most additional 
charitable dollars from the top quintile (top 20 percent) by increasing giving by up to $9.9 
billion. It would have the largest percentage increase in charitable dollars from the third quintile 
(41st to 60th percentile), increasing donations from that income group by up to 16 percent. It 
would likely bring in the fewest additional charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 
percent) by only increasing giving by up to $100 million. It would have the smallest percentage 
increase in charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), only increasing 
donations from that income group by up to 1 percent. 
 
The non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor could stimulate the most additional 
donor households from the top quintile (top 20 percent) by inducing up to 1.8 million additional 
households to donate. It would also have the largest percentage increase in donor households 
in the top quintile (top 20 percent), increasing the number of donor households by up to 7 
percent. It would likely bring in the fewest additional donor households from the first quintile 
(bottom 20 percent) by only inducing up to 100,000 additional households to donate. It would 
also have the smallest percentage increase in donor households in the first quintile (bottom 20 
percent), only increasing the number of donor households by less than 1 percent. 
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Policy 4: Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate 
 
This policy would provide a 25 percent non-refundable tax credit to non-itemizers. Credits are 
generally viewed as fairer than deductions [48] because all taxpayers receive the same benefit 
regardless of their marginal tax rate.15F16 There are concerns about the longevity of this policy, 
because policymakers may be able to lower the percent value of the credit over time without 
taxpayers noticing. Other studies indicate that when the tax credit percentage dips below a 
certain percentage, it no longer incentivizes giving as well as other policies.  
 
Overall, the policy is estimated to increase charitable giving dollars by up to $36.9 billion (an 
increase of 10.8 percent over current law) and to increase the number of households that 
donate by up to 10.6 million (an increase of 12.0 percent over current law). The policy would 
reduce Treasury revenue by up to $33.0 billion (a decrease of 0.9 percent from current law). 
Therefore, the policy would bring in up to $3.9 billion more in charitable dollars that is lost in 
Treasury revenue. Furthermore, it would bring in up to 321 additional donor households per 
million dollars lost in Treasury revenue. 
 
Table 8. Effect of a 25 percent non-refundable credit for non-itemizers (Policy 4) on charitable giving dollars and 
number of donors by income bracket  
Income 
Bracket 
Dollars1 Donors2 
Billions Percent Millions Percent 
Bottom 20% $0.1 0.9% 0.2 1.9% 
21%-40% $3.3 17.4% 1.5 11.9% 
41%-60% $8.6 25.9% 2.4 14.6% 
61%-80% $12.9 20.0% 3.3 15.1% 
81%-90%3 $6.9 14.1% 1.9 14.2% 
91%-99%3 $4.8 5.6% 1.3 10.1% 
Top 1%3 $0.4 0.5% 0.1 6.6% 
Overall $36.9 10.8% 10.6 12.0% 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
3Fifth quintile: $12.1 billion (5.7 percent); 3.3 million tax units (12.0 percent) 
 
The 25 percent non-refundable credit could stimulate the most additional charitable dollars 
from the fourth quintile (61st to 80th percentile) by increasing giving by up to $12.9 billion. It 
would have the largest percentage increase in charitable dollars from the third quintile (41st to 
60th percentile), increasing donations from that income group by up to 26 percent. It would 
likely bring in the fewest additional charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent) 
by only increasing giving by up to $100 million. It would have the smallest percentage increase 
in charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), only increasing donations from 
that income group by up to 1 percent. 
 
The 25 percent non-refundable credit could stimulate the most additional donor households 
from the fourth quintile (61st to 80th percentile) by inducing up to 3.3 million additional 
households to donate. It would also have the largest percentage increase in donor households 
                                                 
16 Dollar benefit per dollar donated (which is not the case for a charitable tax deduction). 
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in the fourth quintile (61st to 80th percentile), increasing the number of donor households by up 
to 15 percent. It would likely bring in the fewest additional donor households from the first 
quintile (bottom 20 percent) by only inducing up to 200,000 additional households to donate. It 
would also have the smallest percentage increase in donor households in the first quintile 
(bottom 20 percent), only increasing the number of donor households by up to 2 percent. 
 
The 25 percent non-refundable credit stimulates more additional dollars and more households 
to donate than any of the other policy options at every income level except the top 1 percent 
(See Appendix B). 
 
Policy 5: Enhanced non-itemizer deduction 
 
This policy would provide non-itemizers an enhanced charitable deduction. The enhanced 
deduction would allow single-filers making less than $20,000 (or married couples filing jointly 
making less than $40,000) to deduct 200 percent of their charitable giving, single-filers making 
between $20,000 and $40,000 (or married couples filing jointly making between $40,000 and 
$80,000) to deduct 150 percent of their charitable giving, and single-filers making over $40,000 
(or married couples filing jointly making more than $80,000) to deduct 100 percent of their 
giving (see Table 9).16F17 This policy is modeled after a policy recommendation from the Filer 
Commission [49] and is an attempt at creating a more progressive and equitable tax incentive 
that is tied to taxpayer need. The policy fits well along-side itemizer incentives, but ensures 
low- and middle-income households receive greater incentives (i.e. lower cost of giving) 
compared to higher-income households.  
 
Table 9. Deduction enhancements by income level for single filers and married couples filing jointly 
Deduction Income levels for single filers Income levels for married couples filing jointly 
200% * contributions <$20,000 <$40,000 
150% * contributions $20,000-$39,999.99 $40,000-$79,999.99 
Contributions (100%) ≥$40,000 ≥$80,000 
 
Overall, the policy is estimated to increase charitable giving dollars by up to $29.2 billion (an 
increase of 8.5 percent over current law) and to increase the number of households that 
donate by up to 8.4 million (an increase of 9.5 percent over current law). The policy would 
reduce Treasury revenue by up to $24.3 billion (a decrease of 0.7 percent from current law). 
Therefore, the policy would bring in up to $4.9 billion more in charitable dollars that is lost in 
Treasury revenue. Furthermore, it would bring in up to 346 additional donor households per 
million dollars lost in Treasury revenue. 
 
This enhanced deduction could bring in up to $3 billion more in charitable giving and induce 
1.3 million more households to donate than the basic non-itemizer deduction. In addition, it 
could cost the Treasury up to $2 billion more than the basic non-itemizer deduction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Deducting 100 percent is equivalent to the basic charitable deduction. 
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Table 10. Effect of an enhanced non-itemizer deduction (Policy 5) on charitable giving dollars and number of 
donors by income bracket  
Income 
Bracket 
Dollars1 Donors2 
Billions Percent Millions Percent 
Bottom 20% 0.1 0.9% 0.2 1.6% 
21%-40% 2.7 14.5% 1.2 9.0% 
41%-60% 6.6 19.8% 1.8 10.9% 
61%-80% 8.9 13.9% 2.3 10.6% 
81%-90%3 5.7 11.6% 1.6 12.5% 
91%-99%3 4.6 5.4% 1.3 9.8% 
Top 1%3 0.5 0.6% 0.1 9.0% 
Overall $29.2 8.5% 8.4 9.5% 
1Billions of dollars 
2Millions of tax units 
3Fifth quintile: $10.8 billion (5.0 percent); 3.1 million tax units (11.2 percent) 
 
The enhanced non-itemizer deduction could stimulate the most additional charitable dollars 
from the top quintile (top 20 percent) by increasing giving by up to $10.8 billion. It would have 
the largest percentage increase in charitable dollars from the third quintile (41st to 60th 
percentile), increasing donations from that income group by up to 20 percent. It would likely 
bring in the fewest additional charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent) by 
only increasing giving by up to $100 million. It would have the smallest percentage increase in 
charitable dollars from the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), only increasing donations from that 
income group by up to 1 percent. 
 
The enhanced non-itemizer deduction could stimulate the most additional donor households 
from the top quintile (top 20 percent) by inducing up to 3 million additional households to 
donate. It would also have the largest percentage increase in donor households in the top 
quintile (top 20 percent), increasing the number of donor households by up to 11 percent. It 
would likely bring in the fewest additional donor households from the first quintile (bottom 20 
percent) by only inducing up to 200,000 additional households to donate. It would also have 
the smallest percentage increase in donor households in the first quintile (bottom 20 percent), 
only increasing the number of donor households by up to 1 percent. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While charitable giving has been increasing since the Great Recession [1], the share of 
American households that donate decreased from 2000 to 2014 [2; 19]. Not only has this led to 
fears that the positive trend in charitable giving dollars is not sustainable [19], but it raises 
issues of equity among donors and nonprofits since giving is becoming increasingly 
concentrated among high-income households [9; 10; 20]. Furthermore, the 2017 Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act was one of the largest changes to federal income tax policy in recent history and it 
was expected to have a significant negative impact on charitable giving [3-5; 50-52]. Nonprofit 
leaders and policymakers have been trying to find policy options that stimulate charitable 
giving (both total dollars donated and the number of households that donate) and are 
equitable. The five policy proposals analyzed in this report target tax reform for non-itemizers, 
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which primarily includes low- and middle-income households. While four of the five proposals 
could potentially offset the predicted drop in charitable dollars as a result of TCJA, a non-
refundable 25 percent tax credit would have the largest positive impact overall, in addition to 
being one of the fairer proposals. Furthermore, all five proposals more than offset the predicted 
drop in in number of donor households as a result of TCJA, with the non-refundable 25 percent 
tax credit having the largest positive impact on the number of households that donate to 
nonprofits overall and at every income level except the top 1 percent. 
 
While the non-refundable 25 percent tax credit has the biggest positive impact on gross 
charitable giving dollars and number of donor households, it is also the most expensive option 
for the Treasury. Therefore, it is important to consider which policy has the largest net positive 
impact on charitable dollars and the number of donor households compared to the cost to the 
Treasury. The non-itemizer deduction with a modified 1 percent floor has the largest positive 
net impact on charitable dollars, bringing in an estimated $7 billion more in charitable dollars 
than are lost in Treasury revenue (in other words, this policy brings in $1.39 for each $1 lost in 
Treasury revenue). The non-itemizer deduction with a $4,000/$8,000 cap has the largest 
impact on the number of donor households compared to Treasury costs; it would induce an 
additional 352 households to donate to nonprofits for each $1 million lost in Treasury revenue.  
 
There are many issues to consider when examining the impact of tax policies. Not only should 
nonprofit leaders and advocates as well as policymakers consider the effect of each policy on 
charitable giving dollars, the number of households that donate, and Treasury revenue, but 
they should consider issues of donor equity and efficiency. This report is meant to provide 
empirical data to inform conversations surrounding incentives for charitable giving for non-
itemizers. 
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Appendix A. Methodology 
 
Penn Wharton Budget Model 
 
The Penn Wharton Budget Model microsimulation (PWBMsim) models the United States 
economy to examine the effects of government policies. It takes into account the nation’s 
demographic and economic backdrop by using a simulated dataset (micro data) that 
represents the population of the United States in any given year beginning in 1996. The micro 
data is based on a number of data sources, including the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and numerous other surveys. Demographic 
attributes of individuals and families are assigned in the following order: 
1. Family head and immigration status (i.e. foreign born or domestic born) 
2. Family status and attributes (e.g. single individual, single-headed individual with children, or 
married individual with or without children) 
3. Assignment of individual attributes to members of the family (ethnicity, gender, education 
level, disability status, employment status, work weeks in the year, etc.) 
4. Each year annual transitions are assigned to each individual as well (age +1, birth, death, 
marriage and/or divorce, educational attainment, etc.) 
Additional information on how the Penn Wharton Budget Model microsimulation assigns and 
measures individual and family attributes can be found on their website at 
http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/microsimulation 
 
Macroeconomic variables are also applied to the model. These include gross domestic product 
(GDP), employment, labor productivity, capital stock, capital-labor ratio, as well as revenue, 
expenditures, the federal deficit and government debt. 
 
The Tax Module uses the microsimulation model and applies it to different types of taxfilers to 
forecast federal tax revenues. In addition, it has been modified to project charitable giving 
dollars and number of donor households. Image A-1 illustrates the workflow of the Tax Module, 
using a dynamic feedback model which considers the feedback effects of how changes in tax 
policy affect the U.S. economy and the federal budget. 
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Image A.1. Penn Wharton Budget Model’s Tax Module (PWBM-TM)  
 
 
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Tax Module. Retrieved from 
http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/tax-module 
 
[1] The Microsimulation outputs a myriad of 
variables. These variables include 
information on households (wage, gender, 
kids, etc.) as well as macroeconomic 
series. 
[2] These changes can take many forms. 
Examples include changes in statutory 
rates, deduction allowances, or credit 
eligibility. 
[3] The outputs of the Tax Module include 
revenues, outlays, and distributional 
analytics. 
[4] Revenues, outlays, and tax rates 
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Tax-Price Elasticity of Giving 
 
These analyses rely on tax-price elasticities of giving that were calculated in a previous study 
[3]. In that study, we used the Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS) [2] and the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) [44] to calculate income-dependent elasticities. Most previous 
research that calculates tax-price elasticities relied on tax data from the IRS, which does not 
include giving by non-itemizers [53; 54]. Moreover, research estimating the effects of various 
tax policies on charitable giving have either used these elasticities based on tax-data or have 
relied on standard, conservative elasticities of -1.0 or -0.5 [45; 46]. Therefore, for the sake of 
comparison and completeness, all analyses were run using three sets of elasticities (-0.5, -1.0, 
and income-dependent elasticities). For more information on the calculation of the income-
dependent elasticities, as well as on the scholarly work on the tax-price elasticity of giving, see 
Rooney, Osili, Zarins, & Bergdoll (2017). 
 
Limitations 
 
While this study has many strengths, there are some limitations that should be noted: 
(1) Policy options may change: This study attempts to analyze the most relevant policy 
options available. However, these policies could change as the debates among 
nonprofit leaders, advocates, and policymakers continue. Not only can these policies 
change prior to their introduction as bills in the United States Congress, but those that 
are or have been introduced as likely to be changed during negotiations throughout the 
relevant committee, House, and Senate debates. 
(2) Magnitude of TCJA: TCJA was a significant change to federal tax policy. While a lot of 
research is being done to both predict and measure the effects, the actual effects are 
still unclear and won’t be fully understood for many years. 
(3) Underlying data: The literature shows that research on the effects of tax policy varies 
based on the dataset used. Therefore, while we used the best available data, it is 
possible that other datasets could produce different results. 
(4) Unmeasured effects: There are some considerations that are important when 
considering changes to tax policy that were not measured or estimated as part of this 
study. For example, we did not estimate the administrative costs of implementing the 
individual policies. In addition, the effects of the various policies could vary by region or 
state,17F18 which is also an important consideration. 
  
                                                 
18 Individual state tax policies can also affect charitable giving and revenue. 
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Appendix B. Tables comparing policy options within income groups 
 
Table B.1: Charitable giving dollars (billions of dollars), 2021 
Income bracket Bottom 20% 21%-40% 41%-60% 61%-80% 81%-90% 91%-99% Top 1% 
Baseline $11.5 $18.9 $33.3 $64.2 $48.9 $85.4 $79.7 
 Change from 2021 baseline (current law) 
(1) Non-itemizer deduction (UCD*) $0.1 (0.8%) $2.0 (10.8%) $5.4 (16.3%) $7.9 (12.2%) $5.7 (11.6%) $4.6 (5.4%) $0.5 (0.6%) 
(2) UCD with $4,000/$8000 cap $0.1 (0.8%) $1.5 (8.0%) $3.6 (10.8%) $5.0 (7.8%) $3.9 (8.3%) $3.1 (3.6%) $0.3 (0.3%) 
(3) UCD with modified 1% floor $0.1 (0.8%) $2.0 (10.7%) $5.3 (16.0%) $7.6 (11.8%) $5.4 (11.3%) $4.2 (4.9%) $0.3 (0.4%) 
(4) 25% Credit $0.1 (0.9%) $3.3 (17.4%) $8.6 (25.9%) $12.9 (20.0%) $6.9 (14.1%) $4.8 (5.6%) $0.4 (0.5%) 
(5) Enhanced UCD $0.1 (0.9%) $2.7 (14.5%) $6.6 (19.8%) $8.9 (13.9%) $5.7 (11.6%) $4.6 (5.4%) $0.5 (0.6%) 
*Universal charitable deduction 
Red numbers indicate the policy that makes the largest positive impact on charitable giving dollars for each income group 
 
Table B.2: Number of donor households (millions of tax units), 2021 
Income bracket Bottom 20% 21%-40% 41%-60% 61%-80% 81%-90% 91%-99% Top 1% 
Baseline 10.3 12.9 16.2 21.5 13.1 13.0 1.5 
 Change from 2021 baseline (current law) 
(1) Non-itemizer deduction (UCD*) 0.1 (0.9%) 0.7 (5.6%) 1.4 (8.5%) 2.1 (9.5%) 1.6 (12.5%) 1.3 (9.8%) 0.1 (9.0%) 
(2) UCD with $4,000/$8000 cap 0.1 (0.9%) 0.7 (5.5%) 1.3 (8.2%) 2.0 (9.1%) 1.6 (12.1%) 1.2 (9.4%) 0.1 (8.6%) 
(3) UCD with modified 1% floor 0.1 (0.6%) 0.5 (3.8%) 0.9 (5.6%) 1.3 (6.1%) 1.0 (7.7%) 0.8 (5.8%) 0.1 (4.7%) 
(4) 25% Credit 0.2 (1.9%) 1.5 (11.9%) 2.4 (14.6%) 3.3 (15.1%) 1.9 (14.2%) 1.3 (10.1%) 0.1 (6.6%) 
(5) Enhanced UCD 0.2 (1.6%) 1.2 (9.0%) 1.8 (10.9%) 2.3 (10.6%) 1.6 (12.5%) 1.3 (9.8%) 0.1 (9.0%) 
*Universal charitable deduction 
Red numbers indicate the policy that makes the largest positive impact on the number of donor households for each income group 
  
Projected revenue loss under various tax reform proposals, 2020-2029
Billions of dollars
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Total
Non-itemizer deduction
Static -14.4 -19.3 -20.0 -20.7 -21.5 -22.4 -14.0 -11.9 -12.3 -12.7 -169.3
Low elasticity -15.0 -20.0 -20.8 -21.6 -22.5 -23.4 -14.7 -12.4 -12.9 -13.3 -176.6
High elasticity -15.5 -20.8 -21.6 -22.4 -23.2 -24.1 -15.3 -12.9 -13.4 -13.8 -183.1
Income-based elasticities -16.1 -21.6 -22.4 -23.3 -24.2 -25.2 -16.1 -13.8 -14.4 -14.9 -192.0
Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8000 cap
Static -13.1 -17.5 -18.1 -18.8 -19.5 -20.3 -12.9 -11.0 -11.5 -11.8 -154.4
Low elasticity -13.8 -18.4 -19.1 -19.8 -20.6 -21.4 -13.7 -11.8 -12.2 -12.6 -163.4
High elasticity -14.4 -19.2 -19.9 -20.6 -21.4 -22.3 -14.5 -12.4 -13.0 -13.4 -171.1
Income-based elasticities -14.8 -19.9 -20.6 -21.4 -22.2 -23.2 -15.4 -13.5 -14.1 -14.5 -179.6
Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% AGI floor
Static -11.7 -15.7 -16.3 -16.9 -17.5 -18.2 -11.6 -9.8 -10.2 -10.5 -138.5
Low elasticity -12.3 -16.4 -17.1 -17.7 -18.4 -19.1 -12.2 -10.3 -10.7 -11.0 -145.1
High elasticity -12.8 -17.1 -17.7 -18.4 -19.1 -19.8 -12.7 -10.8 -11.2 -11.5 -151.0
Income-based elasticities -13.4 -17.9 -18.5 -19.3 -20.0 -20.9 -13.4 -11.5 -12.1 -12.4 -159.4
Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate
Static -20.6 -27.5 -28.6 -29.6 -30.6 -31.7 -19.5 -16.2 -16.8 -17.3 -238.4
Low elasticity -21.9 -29.3 -30.4 -31.5 -32.6 -33.8 -20.8 -17.3 -17.9 -18.5 -254.0
High elasticity -23.2 -31.0 -32.1 -33.2 -34.5 -35.7 -21.8 -17.9 -18.5 -19.1 -266.9
Income-based elasticities -24.6 -33.0 -34.2 -35.4 -36.8 -38.3 -23.3 -19.3 -20.2 -20.8 -285.9
Enhanced non-itemizer deduction
Static -15.9 -21.3 -22.1 -22.9 -23.8 -24.8 -16.3 -14.1 -14.7 -15.1 -191.0
Low elasticity -16.6 -22.3 -23.2 -24.1 -25.0 -26.0 -17.1 -14.8 -15.5 -15.9 -200.5
High elasticity -17.3 -23.2 -24.1 -25.0 -26.0 -27.0 -17.9 -15.5 -16.1 -16.6 -208.7
Income-based elasticities -18.2 -24.3 -25.3 -26.3 -27.4 -28.5 -19.0 -16.7 -17.5 -18.1 -221.2
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policies take effect in 2020. Years are fiscal year concept. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 
under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected revenue loss under various tax reform proposals, 2020-2029
Percent change from baseline total federal revenues
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Total
Non-itemizer deduction 3594.13 3726.14 3916.23 4096.14 4267.99 4463.63 4605.26 4867.19 5103.43 5288.79 43928.92
Static -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.4%
Low elasticity -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
High elasticity -0.4% -0.6% -0.6% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
Income-based elasticities -0.4% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8000 cap
Static -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.4%
Low elasticity -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.4%
High elasticity -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
Income-based elasticities -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% AGI floor
Static -0.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3%
Low elasticity -0.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3%
High elasticity -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3%
Income-based elasticities -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.4%
Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate
Static -0.6% -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.5%
Low elasticity -0.6% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.5% -0.4% -0.4% -0.3% -0.6%
High elasticity -0.6% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% -0.5% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.6%
Income-based elasticities -0.7% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.5% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.7%
Enhanced non-itemizer deduction
Static -0.4% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
Low elasticity -0.5% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.5%
High elasticity -0.5% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.5%
Income-based elasticities -0.5% -0.7% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.5%
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policies take effect in 2020. Years are fiscal year concept. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 
under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by individuals under various tax reform proposals, 2018-2029
Billions of dollars
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Non-itemizer deduction
Low elasticity - - 8.4 8.7 9.1 9.4 9.8 10.2 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.7
High elasticity - - 16.8 17.5 18.2 18.8 19.5 20.3 10.3 10.7 11.2 11.4
Income-based elasticities - - 24.9 26.2 27.7 29.0 30.4 32.1 19.1 20.2 21.3 22.1
Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8,000 cap
Low elasticity - - 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.7 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.1
High elasticity - - 11.2 11.6 12.1 12.4 12.9 13.4 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.1
Income-based elasticities - - 16.6 17.4 18.4 19.2 20.2 21.4 13.7 14.4 15.2 15.8
Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% AGI floor
Low elasticity - - 7.9 8.2 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.6 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.5
High elasticity - - 15.9 16.5 17.2 17.7 18.4 19.1 9.9 10.2 10.6 10.9
Income-based elasticities - - 23.7 24.9 26.3 27.5 28.9 30.5 18.3 19.3 20.4 21.2
Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate
Low elasticity - - 11.4 11.9 12.4 12.8 13.2 13.7 6.8 7.0 7.3 7.5
High elasticity - - 22.8 23.8 24.7 25.6 26.5 27.4 13.5 14.1 14.6 15.0
Income-based elasticities - - 35.1 36.9 38.9 40.7 42.7 44.8 25.4 26.9 28.3 29.5
Enhanced non-itemizer deduction
Low elasticity - - 9.2 9.5 9.9 10.3 10.7 11.1 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.7
High elasticity - - 18.3 19.1 19.9 20.6 21.4 22.2 12.0 12.4 13.0 13.3
Income-based elasticities - - 27.7 29.2 30.8 32.3 34.0 35.9 22.5 23.8 25.2 26.2
Addendum: Pre-TCJA baseline 318.4 333.8 347.2 360.3 375.1 388.6 403.4 419.2 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policies take effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 
AGI, -1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by individuals under various tax reform proposals, 2018-2029
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (billions of dollars) 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Non-itemizer deduction
Low elasticity - - 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
High elasticity - - 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3%
Income-based elasticities - - 7.6% 7.7% 7.8% 7.9% 7.9% 8.1% 4.4% 4.4% 4.5% 4.5%
Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8,000 cap
Low elasticity - - 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
High elasticity - - 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Income-based elasticities - - 5.1% 5.1% 5.2% 5.2% 5.3% 5.4% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2%
Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% AGI floor
Low elasticity - - 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
High elasticity - - 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2%
Income-based elasticities - - 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 7.7% 4.2% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3%
Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate
Low elasticity - - 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
High elasticity - - 6.9% 7.0% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1%
Income-based elasticities - - 10.7% 10.8% 10.9% 11.0% 11.2% 11.3% 5.8% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0%
Enhanced non-itemizer deduction
Low elasticity - - 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
High elasticity - - 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
Income-based elasticities - - 8.4% 8.5% 8.7% 8.8% 8.9% 9.0% 5.2% 5.2% 5.3% 5.4%
Addendum: Pre-TCJA baseline 318.4 333.8 347.2 360.3 375.1 388.6 403.4 419.2 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policies take effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -
1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by income, 2018-2029: Non-itemizer deduction
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (billions of dollars) 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Bottom quintile 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.7
Second quintile 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.1 20.7 21.3 22.5 23.3 24.2 24.9
Third quintile 29.5 30.9 32.2 33.3 34.4 35.6 36.7 38.0 40.7 42.0 43.7 45.0
Fourth quintile 57.3 59.8 61.9 64.2 66.5 68.5 70.9 73.4 79.5 82.2 85.5 87.7
80% - 90% 43.7 45.6 47.3 48.9 50.3 51.9 53.3 55.1 60.0 62.3 64.3 66.0
90% - 99% 74.7 78.5 81.9 85.4 89.3 92.9 97.1 101.0 112.3 117.7 122.9 127.2
Top 1% 68.9 72.8 76.3 79.7 84.0 87.3 91.4 95.9 107.2 112.9 118.9 123.4
Policy, low elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Second quintile - - 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
Third quintile - - 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8%
Fourth quintile - - 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.3%
80% - 90% - - 4.5% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7%
90% - 99% - - 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Top 1% - - 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Policy, high elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3%
Second quintile - - 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 5.3% 5.4% 5.4%
Third quintile - - 7.5% 7.5% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.7% 5.6% 5.7% 5.7% 5.6%
Fourth quintile - - 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7%
80% - 90% - - 9.0% 9.1% 9.1% 9.2% 9.2% 9.3% 3.4% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4%
90% - 99% - - 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Top 1% - - 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Policy, income-based elasticities
Bottom quintile - - 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 2.8%
Second quintile - - 10.8% 10.8% 11.0% 11.0% 11.2% 11.5% 11.7% 11.9% 12.0% -88.0%
Fourth quintile - - 15.7% 16.3% 17.1% 17.7% 18.4% 19.2% 14.9% 15.3% 15.5% 15.6%
Third quintile - - 12.2% 12.2% 12.3% 12.2% 12.2% 12.2% 7.0% 7.2% 7.3% 7.5%
80% - 90% - - 11.3% 11.6% 12.0% 12.3% 12.7% 13.1% 5.5% 5.6% 5.8% 5.9%
90% - 99% - - 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8%
Top 1% - - 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policy takes effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-
based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by income, 2018-2029: Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8,000 cap
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (billions of dollars) 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Bottom quintile 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.7
Second quintile 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.1 20.7 21.3 22.5 23.3 24.2 24.9
Third quintile 29.5 30.9 32.2 33.3 34.4 35.6 36.7 38.0 40.7 42.0 43.7 45.0
Fourth quintile 57.3 59.8 61.9 64.2 66.5 68.5 70.9 73.4 79.5 82.2 85.5 87.7
80% - 90% 43.7 45.6 47.3 48.9 50.3 51.9 53.3 55.1 60.0 62.3 64.3 66.0
90% - 99% 74.7 78.5 81.9 85.4 89.3 92.9 97.1 101.0 112.3 117.7 122.9 127.2
Top 1% 68.9 72.8 76.3 79.7 84.0 87.3 91.4 95.9 107.2 112.9 118.9 123.4
Policy, low elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6%
Second quintile - - 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Third quintile - - 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Fourth quintile - - 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
80% - 90% - - 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
90% - 99% - - 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Top 1% - - 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Policy, high elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2%
Second quintile - - 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Third quintile - - 5.0% 5.0% 5.1% 5.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1%
Fourth quintile - - 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2%
80% - 90% - - 6.2% 6.2% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 6.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
90% - 99% - - 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Top 1% - - 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Policy, income-based elasticities
Bottom quintile - - 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6%
Second quintile - - 8.0% 8.0% 8.1% 8.1% 8.2% 8.5% 8.8% 8.9% 8.9% 9.0%
Fourth quintile - - 10.4% 10.8% 11.4% 11.8% 12.3% 12.9% 10.7% 11.0% 11.1% 11.3%
Third quintile - - 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.7% 4.8% 4.9% 5.0% 5.1%
80% - 90% - - 7.7% 8.0% 8.3% 8.5% 8.8% 9.1% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3%
90% - 99% - - 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 3.5% 3.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Top 1% - - 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policy takes effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-
based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by income, 2018-2029: Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% of AGI floor
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (billions of dollars) 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Bottom quintile 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.7
Second quintile 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.1 20.7 21.3 22.5 23.3 24.2 24.9
Third quintile 29.5 30.9 32.2 33.3 34.4 35.6 36.7 38.0 40.7 42.0 43.7 45.0
Fourth quintile 57.3 59.8 61.9 64.2 66.5 68.5 70.9 73.4 79.5 82.2 85.5 87.7
80% - 90% 43.7 45.6 47.3 48.9 50.3 51.9 53.3 55.1 60.0 62.3 64.3 66.0
90% - 99% 74.7 78.5 81.9 85.4 89.3 92.9 97.1 101.0 112.3 117.7 122.9 127.2
Top 1% 68.9 72.8 76.3 79.7 84.0 87.3 91.4 95.9 107.2 112.9 118.9 123.4
Policy, low elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Second quintile - - 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7%
Third quintile - - 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
Fourth quintile - - 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.9% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2%
80% - 90% - - 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 4.4% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6%
90% - 99% - - 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Top 1% - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Policy, high elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3%
Second quintile - - 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 5.1% 5.2% 5.2% 5.3% 5.3%
Third quintile - - 7.3% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.4%
Fourth quintile - - 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
80% - 90% - - 8.5% 8.6% 8.6% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1%
90% - 99% - - 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Top 1% - - 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Policy, income-based elasticities
Bottom quintile - - 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.9%
Second quintile - - 10.7% 10.7% 10.9% 11.0% 11.1% 11.4% 11.6% 11.7% 11.9% 11.9%
Fourth quintile - - 15.4% 16.0% 16.8% 17.3% 18.0% 18.8% 14.4% 14.8% 15.0% 15.1%
Third quintile - - 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 6.8% 6.9% 7.0% 7.2%
80% - 90% - - 10.7% 11.0% 11.3% 11.6% 12.0% 12.4% 5.2% 5.2% 5.4% 5.5%
90% - 99% - - 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
Top 1% - - 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policy takes effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-
based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by income, 2018-2029: Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (billions of dollars) 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Bottom quintile 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.7
Second quintile 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.1 20.7 21.3 22.5 23.3 24.2 24.9
Third quintile 29.5 30.9 32.2 33.3 34.4 35.6 36.7 38.0 40.7 42.0 43.7 45.0
Fourth quintile 57.3 59.8 61.9 64.2 66.5 68.5 70.9 73.4 79.5 82.2 85.5 87.7
80% - 90% 43.7 45.6 47.3 48.9 50.3 51.9 53.3 55.1 60.0 62.3 64.3 66.0
90% - 99% 74.7 78.5 81.9 85.4 89.3 92.9 97.1 101.0 112.3 117.7 122.9 127.2
Top 1% 68.9 72.8 76.3 79.7 84.0 87.3 91.4 95.9 107.2 112.9 118.9 123.4
Policy, low elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8%
Second quintile - - 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9%
Third quintile - - 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9%
Fourth quintile - - 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.8% 6.7% 6.8% 3.3% 3.4% 3.3% 3.3%
80% - 90% - - 5.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
90% - 99% - - 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Top 1% - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Policy, high elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5%
Second quintile - - 7.7% 7.8% 7.8% 7.9% 7.9% 8.1% 7.6% 7.8% 7.9% 7.9%
Third quintile - - 11.8% 11.8% 11.9% 11.9% 12.0% 12.0% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 7.9%
Fourth quintile - - 13.4% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7%
80% - 90% - - 10.8% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 11.0% 11.0% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4%
90% - 99% - - 4.7% 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Top 1% - - 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Policy, income-based elasticities
Bottom quintile - - 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.4%
Second quintile - - 17.3% 17.4% 17.5% 17.6% 17.7% 18.0% 17.1% 17.4% 17.6% 17.6%
Fourth quintile - - 25.0% 25.9% 27.0% 27.9% 29.0% 30.0% 20.6% 21.2% 21.4% 21.7%
Third quintile - - 19.9% 20.0% 20.1% 20.1% 20.1% 20.2% 10.0% 10.3% 10.4% 10.6%
80% - 90% - - 13.7% 14.1% 14.5% 14.9% 15.3% 15.7% 5.9% 5.9% 6.1% 6.1%
90% - 99% - - 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Top 1% - - 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policy takes effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-
based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in charitable giving by income, 2018-2029: Enhanced non-itemizer deduction
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (billions of dollars) 301.4 316.1 329.1 341.9 356.0 368.5 382.6 397.7 435.7 454.4 473.9 488.9
Bottom quintile 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.4 14.7
Second quintile 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.1 20.7 21.3 22.5 23.3 24.2 24.9
Third quintile 29.5 30.9 32.2 33.3 34.4 35.6 36.7 38.0 40.7 42.0 43.7 45.0
Fourth quintile 57.3 59.8 61.9 64.2 66.5 68.5 70.9 73.4 79.5 82.2 85.5 87.7
80% - 90% 43.7 45.6 47.3 48.9 50.3 51.9 53.3 55.1 60.0 62.3 64.3 66.0
90% - 99% 74.7 78.5 81.9 85.4 89.3 92.9 97.1 101.0 112.3 117.7 122.9 127.2
Top 1% 68.9 72.8 76.3 79.7 84.0 87.3 91.4 95.9 107.2 112.9 118.9 123.4
Policy, low elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8%
Second quintile - - 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4% 3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7%
Third quintile - - 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 3.5% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6%
Fourth quintile - - 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
80% - 90% - - 4.5% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7%
90% - 99% - - 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Top 1% - - 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Policy, high elasticity
Bottom quintile - - 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5%
Second quintile - - 6.4% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6% 6.7% 6.9% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4%
Third quintile - - 9.0% 9.1% 9.2% 9.3% 9.4% 9.5% 7.0% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1%
Fourth quintile - - 9.3% 9.3% 9.4% 9.3% 9.3% 9.3% 5.5% 5.5% 5.4% 5.4%
80% - 90% - - 9.0% 9.1% 9.1% 9.2% 9.2% 9.3% 3.4% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4%
90% - 99% - - 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Top 1% - - 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Policy, income-based elasticities
Bottom quintile - - 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 3.0% 3.2% 3.3% 3.4%
Second quintile - - 14.4% 14.5% 14.8% 14.8% 15.0% 15.3% 16.0% 16.3% 16.6% 16.6%
Fourth quintile - - 19.1% 19.8% 20.8% 21.7% 22.6% 23.7% 18.5% 19.1% 19.4% 19.6%
Third quintile - - 13.9% 13.9% 13.9% 13.9% 13.9% 13.9% 8.2% 8.4% 8.6% 8.8%
80% - 90% - - 11.3% 11.6% 12.0% 12.3% 12.7% 13.1% 5.5% 5.6% 5.8% 5.9%
90% - 99% - - 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8%
Top 1% - - 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policy takes effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. Tax price elasticities used: "low" = -0.5; "high" -1.0; "income-
based" = -2.236 for tax units under $50K in 2017 AGI, -1.49 under $100K, and -1.182 over $100K.
Projected change in number of donors by income under various tax reform proposals, 2018-2029
Millions of tax units
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline 85.5 86.7 87.4 88.6 89.7 90.5 91.6 92.6 97.2 98.1 99.2 100.0
Bottom quintile 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.7 10.8 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6
Second quintile 12.4 12.6 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.4 14.1 14.2 14.4 14.5
Third quintile 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.6 16.8 17.0 17.9 18.0 18.3 18.4
Fourth quintile 20.8 21.1 21.2 21.5 21.8 22.0 22.3 22.5 23.6 23.8 24.1 24.3
80% - 90% 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.4 13.5 13.7 14.3 14.5 14.6 14.7
90% - 99% 12.6 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.5 13.6 14.3 14.5 14.6 14.7
Top 1% 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Non-itemizer deduction - - 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.8 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Bottom quintile - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Second quintile - - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Third quintile - - 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5
Fourth quintile - - 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
80% - 90% - - 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
90% - 99% - - 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Top 1% - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8,000 cap - - 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.5 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4
Bottom quintile - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Second quintile - - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
Third quintile - - 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Fourth quintile - - 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
80% - 90% - - 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
90% - 99% - - 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Top 1% - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% AGI floor - - 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
Bottom quintile - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Second quintile - - 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Third quintile - - 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Fourth quintile - - 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
80% - 90% - - 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
90% - 99% - - 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Top 1% - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate - - 10.5 10.6 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.3 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.7
Bottom quintile - - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Second quintile - - 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Third quintile - - 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
Fourth quintile - - 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
80% - 90% - - 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
90% - 99% - - 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Top 1% - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Enhanced non-itemizer deduction - - 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.1 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0
Bottom quintile - - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Second quintile - - 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
Third quintile - - 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9
Fourth quintile - - 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
80% - 90% - - 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
90% - 99% - - 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Top 1% - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Addendum: Pre-TCJA baseline 87.9 89.1 89.9 91.0 92.2 93.3 94.5 95.7 97.2 98.1 99.2 100.0
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policies take effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. We use a -0.8 price elasticity, where 
price is an average of the first-dollar tax price (e.g. going from $0 of donations to $1) and next-dollar tax price (e.g. adding an additional dollar of donations to each tax return). 
Projected change in number of donors by income under various tax reform proposals, 2018-2029
Percent change from baseline
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Baseline (millions of tax units) 85.5 86.7 87.4 88.6 89.7 90.5 91.6 92.6 97.2 98.1 99.2 100.0
Bottom quintile 9.9 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.7 10.8 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6
Second quintile 12.4 12.6 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.4 14.1 14.2 14.4 14.5
Third quintile 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.6 16.8 17.0 17.9 18.0 18.3 18.4
Fourth quintile 20.8 21.1 21.2 21.5 21.8 22.0 22.3 22.5 23.6 23.8 24.1 24.3
80% - 90% 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.5 13.7 14.3 14.5 14.6 14.7
90% - 99% 12.6 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.5 13.6 14.3 14.5 14.6 14.7
Top 1% 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Non-itemizer deduction - - 8.2% 8.2% 8.3% 8.3% 8.4% 8.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.6% 5.6%
Bottom quintile - - 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Second quintile - - 5.6% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 6.0% 6.7% 6.8% 6.9% 6.9%
Third quintile - - 8.5% 8.5% 8.6% 8.7% 8.7% 8.8% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%
Fourth quintile - - 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.6% 9.6% 9.6% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7%
80% - 90% - - 12.4% 12.5% 12.5% 12.6% 12.6% 12.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7%
90% - 99% - - 9.8% 9.8% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 10.0% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Top 1% - - 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 8.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Non-itemizer deduction, $4,000/$8,000 cap - - 7.9% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.1% 5.3% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
Bottom quintile - - 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0%
Second quintile - - 5.4% 5.5% 5.6% 5.6% 5.7% 5.9% 6.6% 6.6% 6.7% 6.7%
Third quintile - - 8.2% 8.2% 8.3% 8.3% 8.4% 8.5% 7.7% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8%
Fourth quintile - - 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.2% 6.4% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5%
80% - 90% - - 12.0% 12.1% 12.1% 12.1% 12.2% 12.2% 5.6% 5.5% 5.5% 5.6%
90% - 99% - - 9.4% 9.4% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.6% 2.3% 2.4% 2.3% 2.3%
Top 1% - - 8.5% 8.6% 8.5% 8.5% 8.5% 8.4% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
Non-itemizer deduction, modified 1% AGI floor - - 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
Bottom quintile - - 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Second quintile - - 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6%
Third quintile - - 5.5% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.7% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1%
Fourth quintile - - 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2%
80% - 90% - - 7.6% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.8% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4%
90% - 99% - - 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.9% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Top 1% - - 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Non-refundable credit for non-itemizers, 25% rate - - 12.0% 12.0% 12.0% 12.1% 12.1% 12.2% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.8%
Bottom quintile - - 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.2% 4.2% 4.4% 4.4% 4.5%
Second quintile - - 11.8% 11.9% 12.0% 12.1% 12.2% 12.4% 11.8% 11.8% 11.9% 11.9%
Third quintile - - 14.6% 14.6% 14.7% 14.7% 14.8% 14.8% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4%
Fourth quintile - - 15.1% 15.1% 15.2% 15.2% 15.2% 15.2% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0%
80% - 90% - - 14.1% 14.2% 14.2% 14.3% 14.3% 14.4% 5.7% 5.6% 5.7% 5.7%
90% - 99% - - 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Top 1% - - 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
Enhanced non-itemizer deduction - - 9.5% 9.5% 9.6% 9.6% 9.7% 9.8% 6.9% 6.9% 7.0% 7.0%
Bottom quintile - - 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7%
Second quintile - - 8.9% 9.0% 9.1% 9.2% 9.4% 9.7% 10.8% 10.9% 11.0% 11.0%
Third quintile - - 10.9% 10.9% 11.0% 11.1% 11.2% 11.3% 10.2% 10.2% 10.3% 10.3%
Fourth quintile - - 10.6% 10.6% 10.7% 10.7% 10.7% 10.8% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
80% - 90% - - 12.4% 12.5% 12.5% 12.6% 12.6% 12.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7%
90% - 99% - - 9.8% 9.8% 9.9% 9.9% 9.9% 10.0% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Top 1% - - 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 8.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Addendum: Pre-TCJA baseline 87.9 89.1 89.9 91.0 92.2 93.3 94.5 95.7 97.2 98.1 99.2 100.0
Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model. Projections made using the Wharton Integrated Tax Simulator. 
Notes: Policies take effect in 2020. Years are calendar year concept. AGI percentiles are calculated exlcusive of filers with negative AGI. We use a -0.8 price elasticity, 
where price is an average of the first-dollar tax price (e.g. going from $0 of donations to $1) and next-dollar tax price (e.g. adding an additional dollar of donations to each tax
